

Against the Gradient of Reason

Local minima, anti-rationalism, and the discovery phase of research.

Against the Gradient of Reason argues that serious research requires disciplined anti-rationalism as a generative phase of method. Rational procedure is powerful once a field has a slope, a criterion, and a shared object of correction. On rugged or deceptive landscapes, those same virtues can become a local-minimum machine. Anti-rationalism names the phase in which inquiry loosens its objective and lets anomaly, images, and speculative associations form candidate paths that reason alone could not have reached. Verification still returns, but it returns after the landscape has been disturbed.



Francisco de Goya y Lucientes, The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters, plate 43 from Los Caprichos, 1799. LACMA / Wikimedia Commons, public-domain release.

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The same slope is learned by funding and peer review, by lab training, and by citation networks and institutional prestige. A researcher may follow reason perfectly and still move deeper into a configuration whose limits are hidden by its own productivity.

2 Rugged Search Spaces

Sewall Wright's adaptive landscape gave evolutionary biology one of its most persistent diagrams of this problem. In his 1932 paper, Wright represented possible gene combinations as a field with contours of adaptive value.[3] Peaks mark more adaptive combinations. Valleys mark combinations that selection tends to punish. If a population can only climb from its present position, it may reach the nearest peak and remain there while higher peaks exist elsewhere.




Figure 2. Sewall Wright, cropped Figure 2 from page 358 of "The roles of mutation, inbreeding, crossbreeding and selection in evolution," 1932. The diagram represents a field of gene combinations with adaptive contours; rendered locally from the circulated PDF copy.

The landscape is a metaphor, and its force comes from the blunt constraint that local improvement can obstruct global movement. In optimization, the same constraint appears as hill climbing, a process rational under the information available to it because it chooses the neighboring state with better value. On a smooth convex surface that rule can be enough. On a rugged surface it can end the search early. The agent experiences discipline where the landscape records an inability to cross a valley.

The no-free-lunch theorems give this intuition mathematical form. Wolpert and Macready showed that elevated performance by one optimizer over one class of problems is balanced by performance elsewhere when one averages over all possible problems.[4] A method wins because the problem has structure that the method can exploit. For research, the theorem makes universality a claim about fit, since a procedure succeeds by exploiting structure it already assumes. A discipline that treats that fit as universal smuggles in a claim about the shape of the world.

A non-linear least-squares surface can contain many basins, each offering a minimum from which the immediate neighborhood gives no reason to leave. The figure makes the essay's central analogy literal since the search behaves locally rationally, and that rationality is indexed to the basin in which it begins.




Figure 3. Daniele de Rigo, Multiple local minima, 2002/2009, non-linear least-squares surface with several local minima. Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0; converted locally from SVG to PNG.

Simulated annealing turns the same lesson into a procedure. Kirkpatrick,

Gelatt, and Vecchi made the analogy between statistical mechanics and combinatorial optimization explicit by allowing a search to accept worse moves at higher temperature and reduce that freedom as the system cools.[5] The worse move buys mobility inside the search. A system that refuses deterioration can become trapped by its own prudence.

In research, temperature marks the interval where weak analogies and wrong models can break the tyranny of the current score. Eccentric diagrams, speculative archives, and undisciplined juxtapositions do the same work from another side. During the cooling phase, the same material meets stricter conditions. Anti-rationalism becomes dangerous when it tries to occupy the entire research cycle. Its legitimate territory is the passage out of a basin, after which the tests of truth return.

3 Hypothesis Generation

Peirce's account of abduction places hypothesis formation inside inquiry. A surprising fact appears and an explanation that would make it less surprising is adopted as a candidate for further testing.[6][7] The candidate has value before justification because it opens a route of investigation.

Abduction appears anti-rational when rationality has been narrowed to deduction and confirmation. In actual research the movement is stranger, since the mind notices a mismatch, accepts a temporary image, and lets that image reorganize attention. That first operation is a controlled suspicion, giving inquiry something to work on before it has earned a proof.

Poincare described mathematical invention in terms that make this pre-justificatory layer visible. In "Mathematical Creation," unconscious combination, sudden illumination, and aesthetic selection belong to the work of invention.[8] The mathematician receives proposals from unconscious combination; the trained mind selects among them; later work verifies. This irrational interval belongs inside the rational practice that later tests it.

Darwin's tree sketch carries the same lesson in a biological register. Notebook B shows the branching image before the later architecture of *On the Origin of Species*. At the moment of formation it remains incomplete, handwritten, mixed with ordinary notes, and strong enough to reorganize a question.




Figure 4. Charles Darwin, Notebook B, page 36, 1837, the "I think" tree-of-life sketch. Cambridge University Library / Darwin Correspondence Project. The page is used here as a provisional diagram before a finished explanatory system.

The sketch arranges evidence before it proves anything. The anti-rational interval gives the mind a temporary form that can gather facts differently. A field that forbids such forms in the name of rigor risks losing the very machines that create future rigor.

4 Methodological Pluralism

Feyerabend enters this argument through the problem of closure. The slogan attached to him is often flattened into permission, yet the more demanding claim is that a universal rule of method can suffocate the historical practices through which science actually advances. In the 1970 Minnesota version of “Against Method,” and in the later book, he attacks the idea that scientific progress can be governed by a single rational code applied in advance.[9][10]

Violations of method can acquire the glamour of revolt, a risk Feyerabend’s reception makes visible. The narrower reading treats methodological anarchism as a warning against premature closure. A field should protect the operations by which inconvenient examples, foreign techniques, speculative metaphors, and imported images can enter the work before the gatekeepers know how to grade them.

Kuhn’s anomaly and Feyerabend’s counter-method describe the same search problem at different scales. Kuhn shows how normal science can accumulate unresolved tensions while it still produces competent results. Feyerabend shows how historical science often uses procedures that a clean reconstruction of method would condemn. Together they weaken the myth that rationality has one temperature. Inquiry moves through phases that preserve a paradigm, loosen it, and test the loosened material until a new discipline can form.

The later chain of tests separates exploration from belief protection. A hallucination, a dream image, a speculative diagram, or an analogy gains research value only when it enters that chain of correction. The path it makes available matters more than the first image itself.

5 Visual Search Operators

Images often perform exploratory work that propositions handle poorly. A proposition tends to ask for acceptance or rejection. A diagram can be inhabited before it becomes defensible. It lets a researcher move pieces around, notice relations, and suspend judgment while a new coordinate system forms.

Kepler’s *Mysterium Cosmographicum* used a geometry that failed and still shaped a program. The nested Platonic solids misdescribed solar architecture, yet the image made astronomy think through a structure it would later abandon. It bound mathematics, cosmology, and physical explanation tightly enough for the wrong model to become part of the path toward a better one.




Figure 5. Johannes Kepler, model associated with *Mysterium Cosmographicum*, first published 1596; public-domain reproduction via Wikimedia Commons. A false geometry works here as a search apparatus.

Kircher’s magnetic instruments and diagrams move through another region of the same problem. Experiment and spectacle share the page with analogy, theology, and mechanical imagination before later categories discipline them apart. Modern scientific taste may treat this mixture as embarrassment, but the embarrassment records a method still under construction. The image leaves mechanism and occult force in unresolved contact, catching the boundary before later science hardens it.



Figure 6. Athanasius Kircher, magnetic clock from *Magnes sive de arte magnetica*, 1643. Public-domain reproduction via Wikimedia Commons. The instrument sits between empirical curiosity and speculative machinery.

Warburg's *Mnemosyne Atlas* makes the image-field itself into a research machine.[11] The atlas sets reproductions and maps beside gestures, coins, newspaper fragments, and artworks on black panels. Its argument moves through recurrence and displacement before it can become linear explanation. The panel does not merely illustrate a thought already written elsewhere. It gives the thought a surface on which distant forms can touch.



Figure 7. Aby Warburg, *Bilderatlas Mnemosyne*, final version, October 1929. Warburg Institute Archive, University of London. The black panel makes comparison into a spatial operation.

Warburg also shows why images cannot enter this essay as decoration. The atlas is fertile at the same point where it is dangerous. Association can become fantasy, yet it can also keep a path open long enough for the mind to notice a recurrence that a linear method would have filtered away. Images think sideways when they keep relation available without forcing it immediately into proof.

Goya's *The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters*, used on the cover, belongs inside the argument for the same reason. The print is often taken as a warning that reason must remain awake against superstition. The Spanish *sueno* also carries the sense of dream. Reason asleep may produce monsters; reason dreaming may also produce images that reason awake must later examine. Inquiry works through the alternation between dream and examination.



Figure 8. Francisco de Goya y Lucientes, *The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters*, plate 43 from *Los Caprichos*, 1799. LACMA / Wikimedia Commons, public-domain release. The cover image returns here as a hinge between superstition, dream, and later examination.

6 Research Temperature

Research moves through periods of exploitation, where standards tighten and weak claims die, and periods of exploration, where objectives loosen and strange candidates survive long enough to be inspected. When one period claims the whole method, exploitation hardens stagnation into rigor and exploration licenses confusion as freedom.

Disciplined anti-reason raises the temperature of a project by changing what the project is allowed to treat as material. Under that change, a question can read outside its field before it stabilizes. An image can work as a provisional model, anomalies can remain available long enough to alter the problem, and aesthetic discomfort or chance juxtaposition can become a search operator. The project can also accept a temporary drop in measurable performance so a line of inquiry can cross a valley. These practices need documentation because they create candidates for later judgment.

Once the anti-rational move has produced a candidate path that can be criticized, ordinary virtues return through exact citation and replication where possible. Clarity of inference, proportional claims, and a public record of uncertainty separate anti-rationalism as exploration from irrationalism as shelter by making the enlarged search space submit its results.

When every institution in the chain rewards visible ascent on the same local surface, stagnation can present itself as seriousness. To answer that condition, a research culture has to keep several operators active. Its practices must support ascent and perturbation, preserve anomalies, arrange images, and cool speculation into accountable form. The culture also needs to know which temperature it is using.

The local minimum appears as a computational trap and as a research habit. It shapes thought and funding, publication rhythm and seriousness, and the fear of looking temporarily wrong. Used carefully, anti-rationalism attacks that style first and lets inquiry leave the hill that reason has made comfortable. Reason returns colder and sharper to decide what the excursion found.

7 References

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